China’s Influence Operations’ Use of Opinion Articles
Real world examples of a new DISARM TTP
The image is fictional and just for illustration. Illustrated by Claudia de Sessa.
This article will provide a real-world example of how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses opinion articles to conduct their influence operations. To explore this influence operation technique, this blog post will present different cases where opinion articles were used by the CCP. We will demonstrate other techniques that were used together with opinion articles.
The DISARM Foundation’s framework for classifying influence operation behaviours ( Tactics, Techniques and Procedures - TTPs) is an attempt to standardize the way we speak about influence operation. The framework is divided into sections that describe different stages of an influence operation, from its planning to its preparation and execution.
This series aims to use case studies to describe how specific DISARM TTPs can be applied to threat actor behaviours.
On March 13, the 1.4 update of DISARM was released and a new technique was released:
T0085.007: Develop Opinion Article
DISARM TTP T0085.007: Develop Opinion Article has been seen to be used by threat actors. The DISARM Framework (1) defines T0085.007: Develop Opinion Article in the following way:
“Opinion articles (aka “Op-Eds” or “Editorials”) are articles or regular columns flagged as “opinion” posted to news sources and can be contributed by people outside the organisation.
Flagging articles as opinions allows news organisations to distinguish them from the typical expectations of objective news reporting while distancing the presented opinion from the organisation or its employees.
The use of this technique is not by itself an indication of malicious or inauthentic content; Op-eds are a common format in media. However, threat actors exploit op-eds to, for example, submit opinion articles to local media to promote their narratives.
Examples from the perspective of a news site involve publishing op-eds from perceived prestigious voices to give legitimacy to an inauthentic publication, or supporting causes by hosting op-eds from actors aligned with the organisation’s goals.”
Cases
Case 1: Global Times Opinion Articles
On December 16 2023, an article written by Jan Oberg, the director of the Sweden-based think tank Transnational Foundation for Peace & Future Research, was published by the Chinese state-controlled media Global Times (2).
On December 18 2023, the article was converted into a video using text-to-speech software and uploaded to the YouTube channel @bgmediaapp (3).
On December 19 2023, the same article was republished by the Russian state-controlled media Sputnik, referring to the article as a Global Times article without mentioning its author or it being an opinion article (4). The same day, the article also appeared on the Persian language Sputnik mirroring website hosted by khabarpu .com (5). In the following days, the article was republished by the Afghan news website Heartofasia .af, without mentioning that the article originated from the Global Times (6), the Chinese state-controlled media China Military (7), and the Cambodian news aggregator and news website khmertimeskh .com (8).
Discussion
According to an article by Kecheng Fang, the self-proclaimed Chinese state-controlled media Global Times, a tabloid under the state-controlled People’s Daily (9, 10), is one of the Chinese media entities that are systematically using foreign voices to give legitimacy to their influence operations, (11). The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has identified several cases of foreign influence using opinion articles by these foreign voices (12).
This case is just one of many observed. What makes it stand out is that the individual has in the past admitted to receiving money from another Chinese state-controlled media, China Daily, for writing opinion articles.
This case did not have any breakthrough amongst its target audience as evidenced by the lack of social media interactions the article gained. Jan Oberg is a fringe opinion maker who has rarely received more than 100 interactions on his posts between January and March 2024. The Global Times provides him with a platform to reach new audiences. Examples of the narratives in these posts include:
The denial of the genocide of the Uyghur population in East Turkestan (Xinjiang region) (15, 16),
claiming that the U.S. is waging a new cold war against China (17, 18),
and the offensive NATO narrative that was also identified by the NGO China Observers (19, 20)
The article also supports the Russian narrative that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was caused by NATO’s over-extension and is a proxy war against Russia.
Jan Oberg has written on his blog that he is paid 100-150 euros per 1000-word article he writes for the Chinese state-controlled media China Daily (21). In a blog post, he writes that the Chinese state-controlled media magazine (self-attributed 22) China Investment asked him to write an article and that the Global Times asked him to make a summary for them (23). This article was also published in a Danish communist paper (24). Based on these blog posts, it is possible that he is also being paid or asked to write articles for the Global Times. The author publishes articles in Chinese state-controlled media almost every month (25). During an interview with DW, Justin Arenstein at the NGO We at Code for Africa also highlighted Chinese media hiring academics and researchers at think tanks to write opinion articles (26).
Sputnik has been attributed as a Russian state-controlled entity and sanctioned by the European Union (13).
The media entity China Military claims to be authorised and sponsored by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (14).
The website khabarpu .com is primarily a Persian-language news aggregator that also is running a Sputnik mirroring website (27, 28).
The Afghan website Heartofasia .af is systematically republishing content from a variety of sources on their website. The “Analysis” section of the website only contains articles from the Global Times (29). When the original Global Times article credits the article to the Global Times, Heartofasia .af also credits the article to them (e.g. 30, 31, 32, 33). When an author is credited instead, Heartofasia .af credits the author but not the Global Times (e.g. 34, 35, 36, 37). The media group owning Hearts of Asia, Axon Media Group, has a partnership with the Chinese state-controlled media China Radio International (CRI) (38, 39).
The YouTube channel @bgmediaapp belongs to a software company registered in the United Kingdom (40, 41, 42).
Case 1 DISARM Framework TTPs:
Case 2: Opinion Articles in Local Media
(This case is following up on a lead mentioned in an article by Freedom House (46))
On August 4, 2022, the Chinese ambassador to Spain wrote an opinion article, voicing China’s stance on Speaker of the House of Representatives of the United States Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan and published it with at least 9 publications belonging to the Spanish media company Prensa Ibérica Media (47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55). The media entities target different Spanish localities and target audiences.
Discussion
In this incident, the Chinese ambassador to Spain used an op-ed to spread China’s views on Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan to different target audiences in Spain. The use of such opinion articles in Spanish media allows China to reach audiences in Spain that they otherwise would not have reached through the embassy's website or Chinese state media. The articles received around 50 likes and shares combined, hence it is difficult to determine the reach of the articles.
The Prensa Ibérica Media websites regularly republish articles from the Chinese state-controlled media conglomerate (56) China Media Group (CMG) (e.g. 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63). At least one of these articles seems to originate from the China Media Group’s All Media Service Platform (64, 65). China Media Group’s All Media Service Platform provides partner media entities with media content that they can republish on their websites (66). To republish the content from this website, users are encouraged to sign up and download content. This platform will be explored in more detail in future articles. A delegation from China Media Group visited the offices of Prensa Ibérica Media in November 2023 (67).
Prensa Ibérica Media's systematic republication of content from CMG and repeated interactions with CMG might indicate some type of partnership between China Media Group and Prensa Ibérica Media, which is not disclosed.
Case 2 DISARM TTPs
Case 3 Russian Use of Chinese State-controlled Media
The director general of the state-controlled Russian International Affairs Council Andrey Kortunov has published at least opinion one article a month since January 2023 in the Chinese state-controlled media Global Times (68). The latest article, published on January 25, 2024 (69), was also published by the Russian state-controlled media partner Modern Diplomacy (70). The articles generally promote Russia-China ties and discredit the United States and their alias.
Discussion
The Russian International Affairs Council was created by the Russian state resolution of its founders under presidential decree No. 59-rp dated 2 February 2010 On the Establishment of the Non-profit Partnership “Russian International Affairs Council (71). It was founded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, and the Interfax International Information Group (72). The board of trustees is headed by the Russian Foreign Minister (73).
Instead of using Russian state media sanctioned by the EU to reach out to foreign audiences, Andrey Kortunov is publishing opinion articles in a Chinese state media outlet that is not sanctioned.
Modern Diplomacy is partnered with the Russian MFA-controlled publication International Affairs and is allegedly run by the Greek journalist Dimitris Giannakopoulos (74, 75, 76). The chair of the advisory board of Modern Diplomacy wrote a blog post on the website of the Russian International Affairs Council (77, 78). The executive vice-chair also had a column and a blog on the same website (79, 80). Modern Diplomacy is seemingly plagiarising articles from various sources days after they are published. These include media entities such as Politico and international institutions such as the U.N. (e.g. 81, 82, 83, 84), not mentioning the sources of the articles. Other than these publications, Modern Diplomacy is also republishing articles from International Affairs on the same day they are published (e.g. 85, 86, 87, 88).
The Russian actor could be using the opinion articles as a way to spread Russian narratives through a media entity that is not sanctioned by the EU while the Chinese actor uses them as a way to get more legitimacy to their media.
Case 3: DISARM TTPs:
Countermeasures
Opinion articles are themselves not inauthentic or malicious. They are rather a part of the democratic process and should be protected as a medium. With that said, there should be legislation against covert financial agreements or partnerships between media and authoritarian state entities. The Chinese state-controlled media China Daily has in the past paid Western media to post articles in a segment called China Watch. The China Watch sponsored segment was transparent about the nature of the content being paid, which makes it less problematic (89).
Another possible countermeasure is to legislate a law that forces opinion makers or publications to reveal when an opinion writer is being paid by a media entity tied to an authoritarian state entity.
Both these actions would allow readers to make an informed decision on whether they wish to consume content being financed by an authoritarian government.
Conclusions
While opinion articles alone are not manipulative or malign, they can be part of influence operations.
These cases show us how opinion articles can be used to reach audiences that an actor otherwise would have had limited ability to reach. We can also see in the first and last cases how the Chinese actor is creating personas around the opinion article writers to give themselves more legitimacy. Opinion articles can both be used to finance aligning voices, as we saw in the case of Jan Oberg and to give a platform to aligning voices that otherwise have limited reach.
Opinion articles can also give the publishing publication legitimacy, especially if the authors are described as experts. Opinion articles can also attract new audiences to the publication, as the author is likely to share the opinion article on their social media platforms, exposing their audiences to the existence of the publication.
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